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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans may have been the first to grapple with the concept of
constitutional review, but they were certainly not the last. The common law
world has observed the legacies of Marbury v. Madison' with a mixture of
trepidation and envy. Its discomfort with the judiciary's power to nullify the
legislative commands of an elected majority eventually prompted various
Commonwealth legislatures to initiate their own unique constitutional
responses to the intricate conundrum of balancing legislative supremacy with
the judicial protection of human rights.
These Commonwealth legislative developments have in turn peaked the
interests of constitutional scholars within the United States, who have become
increasingly wary of unelected judges trumping the legislative command of
elected officials. Of this burgeoning field within academic circles, two recent
articles are particularly insightful in their discussions on the Commonwealth
model ofconstitutionalism. In one, Professor Stephen Gardbaum examines the
constitutional models of the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand and
makes a measured defense of the U.K.'s Human Rights Act as the optimal
response to the counter-maj oritarian difficulty of constitutional review in the
realm of human rights protection.2 In the other, Professor Mark Tushnet is
more skeptical of the various Commonwealth responses and argues that these
various models of "weak-form judicial review"3 are unstable versions of
"constrained parliamentarianism"4 and may easily escalate into strong-form
review of the American variety.5 While both scholars differ in the conclusions
they draw from their comparative endeavor, they appear to make the same
assumption that of all the common law jurisdictions, the United States' mode
of judicial review lies on the extreme end of the continuum measuring the
strength of the judiciary vis-d-vis the legislature.6
This Article puts forward two main claims. First, the Canadian model of
constitutional review is the optimal constitutional model available among the
common law jurisdictions in balancing legislative finality with judicial
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 707 (2001).
Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and
Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 814 (2003).
4 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation ofPowers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,664-66 (2000).
Tushnet, supra note 3, at 814. See also Ackerman, supra note 4, at 664-66.
6 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 710; Tushnet, supra note 3, at 813.
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protection of human rights. Pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms (Charter), while the judiciary has the power to invalidate
legislation passed by Parliament, the legislature has the power to suspend this
invalidation for a period of five years, subject to renewal.7 In defending this
claim, I evaluate prominent common law models of constitutional review,
including that of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand and address the concerns that Gardbaum and Tushnet have expressed
regarding the Canadian model.
In my evaluation of the models ofjudicial review present in other common
law jurisdictions, I also dispute the scholars' assumption that America lies on
the extreme end of the continuum measuring the level of finality of a judicial
determination of unconstitutionality by offering India as a fifth common law
jurisdiction for discussion. I argue that the Supreme Court of India remains the
most powerful common law court in the world in so far as it has the power to
invalidate constitutional amendments,8 a power even the Supreme Court of the
United States has definitively rejected.9
The second main claim is that if the structural status quo were to remain in
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United States, the onus would be
on the respective national courts to make doctrinal adjustments to their
jurisprudence so as to ameliorate the deficiencies in their respective
constitutional systems.
For the United States, as a constitutional decision may only be overturned
by a supermajority in Congress and the state legislatures, the American
judiciary, when nullifying legislation, should rest its decisions on the barest
minimum basis to resolve the particular dispute, rather than formulate a
constitutional rule that is broader than the facts to which it is applied requires.
Admittedly, this proposition is not new, as this theory of "decisional
' See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 33(1)-(4) (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1.
9 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 137 (1943). Justice Murphy, in rejecting
the application of a general doctrine of implied limitations, held that
[t]he constitutional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge a political
strait-jacket for the generations to come. Instead they wrote Article V ....
[which] contains procedural provisions for constitutional change by
amendment without any present limitation whatsoever except that no State
may be deprived of equal representation in the Senate without its consent.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, aside from one caveat, so long as the procedural requisites are
satisfied, the United States Constitution does not impose any other substantive limits on future
generations to amend the provisions in the text.
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minimalism" has been presented by the eminent scholar, Cass Sunstein. l°
However, I argue in favor of a modified version of Sunstein's theory, which
I term "dialogic minimalism," whereby thejudiciary, when formulating narrow
constitutional rules by way of non-decisive dicta, should, at the same time,
initiate a constitutional dialogue with the political branches about the
theoretical underpinnings and mandates of the Constitution.
As for the United Kingdom and New Zealand, I argue that the courts should
be more aggressive in the deployment of their interpretive mandates bestowed
under their respective human rights instruments. Under Section 3 of the
U.K.'s Human Rights Act, British courts must interpret and give effect to
legislation in a way which is compatible with the European Convention on
Human Rights "so far as it is possible to do so." In the same vein, Section 6
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights contains an interpretive mandate requiring
that "[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent
with ... this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other
meaning."' 2  Rather than issuing advisory declarations when a particular
statute is incompatible with human rights norms, the British and New Zealand
courts should be more activist in using their interpretive mandates to "read in"
words or "read down" statutes that are in violation of enshrined civil liberties
rather than waiting passively for Parliament to amend the infringing statutes
of its own accord. So long as such a statutory construction is linguistically
possible and does not mandate drastic legislative reforms that would affect
related statutory regimes, the possibility that such a reading is contrary to
Parliament's actual intentions is immaterial. In both Commonwealth
jurisdictions, the legislatures can return and harness a simple majority to
reinstate their original views in clearer terms.' 3
Part II of this Article begins with an overview of the current state of
constitutional review in the United States. Part III continues with a descriptive
summary of how the constitutional systems of the other common law
jurisdictions (India, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand) have
10 CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999).
1 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (U.K.) ("So far as it is possible to do so, primary
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is
compatible with the Convention rights.").
12 Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, § 6 [hereinafter N.Z. Bill of Rights Act].
'3 In New Zealand and the United Kingdom, human rights instruments are treated as any
other statutory instruments, and as such can be overridden by a Parliamentary majority.
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 735.
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sought to reconcile legislative supremacy with judicial protection of
fundamental rights. Essentially, each jurisdiction is placed at a different point
on a continuum measuring the strength of judicial power in relation to
legislative supremacy. Next, Part IV evaluates the four models and argues that
Canada has the optimal system of reconciling the traditional notions of
legislative finality with our modem aspirations for a judicially-enforced Bill
of Rights. Part V proceeds with a defense of my theory of "dialogic
minimalism," as I argue that, in the absence of a structural change to the U.S.
Constitution, American courts should pronounce "narrow" rules when
engaging in constitutional adjudication while providing some certainty to the
law by using deeply reasoned, non-decisive dicta to initiate a dialogue with the
political branches about the theoretical underpinnings of the constitutional
provisions, so as to trigger a process of legislative self-reflection about the
constitutionality of related legislative action not presented before the Court.
This part also examines recent Supreme Court case law and uses the theory to
analyze these decisions. Finally, in Part VI, I propose that the New Zealand
and British courts should be more "creative" in their use of the interpretive
mandates, and as such, issue declarations of inconsistency only when (1) a
statutory reinterpretation would be textually impossible; (2) the "reading in"
of words would be tantamount to the enactment of a specific and detailed
quasi-legislative code; or (3) a linguistic construction would affect the
coherence of other related statutory regimes not at issue.
II. THE UNITED STATES AND SUPERMAJORITARIAN LEGISLATIVE FINALITY
In the classic decision of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall, on
behalf of the United States Supreme Court, asserted the judicial power to
nullify statutes that were deemed incompatible with the mandate of the
Constitution. 4 Yet, to assume that the Court is therefore the supreme
expositor of the law of the land would be a gross exaggeration.' 5 Article V of
the United States Constitution provides a mechanism for Congress and the
states to respond to unpopular decisions; a constitutional amendment may be
effected when it is proposed by 2/3 of both Houses of Congress (or 2/3 of the
"' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). "No state legislator or executive or judicial
officer can war against the constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." Id. at
18.
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states) and ratified by 3/4 of the states. 6 Thus, the Constitution of the United
States imposes a procedural requirement of supermajoritarian legislative
consensus before a constitutional decision may be reversed.
Admittedly this procedural threshold is not easy to overcome, which
explains why Congress has only successfully used constitutional amendments
to reverse Supreme Court precedents on four occasions. 7 The Eleventh
Amendment was a legislative response to the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,
in which the Court held that a state may be sued in federal court by a plaintiff
from another state. 8 The Eleventh Amendment now provides states with a
considerable form of immunity against costly citizen suits as states are subject
to such suits only if the state consents, with suits also permitted against state
officers. 9 The Thirteenth Amendment was passed in 1865 to reverse the
infamous Dred Scott decision, which held that African-Americans were not
citizens, and thus not subject to constitutional protection.2" Next, the Sixteenth
Amendment reversed Pollock v. Farmers'Loans, thereby securing the right of
Congress to collect federal income tax without the need to apportion among
the states and without regard to any census.' Finally, in 1971, the Twenty-
sixth Amendment reversed Oregon v. Mitchell, holding that citizens of
eighteen years of age and older may not be denied the right to vote on account
of age.22
16 Article V of the United States Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof,
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
'7 See infra notes 18-22.
's Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419 (1793).
19 Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGuEs: INTERPRETATION AS POLTICAL PROCESS 202
(1988); U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
20 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
21 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
22 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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Other attempts to overrule unpopular Supreme Court decisions have all
fallen by the wayside. Congressional proposals to overturn the school prayer
cases,2" the abortion decision,24 and the flag desecration controversy25 never
garnered sufficient votes in both houses to pave the way for state ratification.
26
At other times, even where the proposed legislation attained the requisite level
of approval by Congress, the states were not forthcoming in endorsing the
changes. One such instance was the congressional proposal to prohibit child
labor in 1924, following the Supreme Court decision of Hammer v.
Dagenhart.27 The proposed amendment was never passed as there was an
insufficient number of states willing to ratify it.2"
The concern over the power accorded to the federal judiciary in the United
States is not its de jure supremacy. The foregoing Part has argued against this
common misconception. Congress and the state legislatures are able to act in
tandem and reverse an unpopular precedent. 29 Neither should there be anxiety
over the fact that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the law has the
propensity to be final. After all, a common law decision handed down by the
Supreme Court may equally be final and irrevocable if Congress cannot attract
a simple majority to enact a statute to override a non-constitutional decision.
What is worrisome about constitutional review in the United States is that the
legislature only has the final word if there is supermajoritarian consensus
among the lawmakers that a constitutional amendment is necessary to reverse
an erroneous Supreme Court decision.3" This constitutional requirement of
supermajoritarian legislative consensus confers de facto finality on a judicial
decision even if more than half of Congress and the people's elected state
representatives disagree with the result. It is thus this procedural requirement
of legislative supermajoritarian consensus that raises constitutional concerns
because it allows a Supreme Court precedent to become the default legal rule,
even when there is overwhelming legislative disapproval.
23 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
24 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
26 For further discussion, see FISHER, supra note 19.
27 247 U.S. 251 (1918); FISHER, supra note 19.
2 As late as 1937, only twenty-eight states had ratified this proposed amendment. The
proposal eventually became moot in 1938 when Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act
to regulate child labor. The Act was later upheld by a new panel of Supreme Court justices in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See FISHER, supra note 19 for a fuller discussion.
29 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
30 Id.
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Since Marbury, defenders and deriders of constitutional review in the
United States seem to have been engaged in a zero-sum game. Proponents like
Erwin Chemerinsky favor the empowering of the judiciary to enforce human
rights norms as the life tenure of the judges insulates them from the lobbying
of special interest groups and the pressures exerted by an electorate indifferent
to the plight of disadvantaged minorities.31 Seen in this light, the existence of
an independent and unelected judiciary, with the power to invalidate popular,
but unconstitutional legislation, is necessary to vindicate the rights of minority
groups marginalized by the political process. Judicial skeptics like Jeremy
Waldron perceive the American courts as an undemocratic institution
unaccountable to the public for their actions, constantly thwarting the will of
the popularly elected representative institutions.32 The displacement of the
citizenry's voice as the nation's principal engine of moral change would in turn
discourage the people from engaging in the process of political deliberation
and make the courts the final arbiter of the community's values.33 Government
by judiciary never seemed more foreboding.
Yet, this countermaj oritarian conundrum need not be resolved by awarding
total victory to either camp. The panacea to mitigate the undemocratic nature
ofjudicial review is not to abolish it altogether.34 There are different ways of
structuring the power dynamics between the legislature and the judiciary. In
balancing the need to accord legislative finality to the political branches and
provide a meaningful avenue for independentjudges to vindicate human rights
norms, common law constitutional systems like those of India, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom have all developed their own unique models
of constitutional review.
3' Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense ofJudicialReview: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL.
L. REv. 1013 (2004).
32 See Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OxFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 18, 28 (1993).
13 Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion andDemocratic Debilitation: Comparative illumination
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245 (1995).
34 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTrruTlON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
A. India and the Basic Features Doctrine
In India, the fundamental liberties accorded to its citizensare enshrined in
Part III of the Indian Constitution.35 The Indian courts are also expressly
empowered to invalidate acts of legislation that are incompatible with the
Constitution.36 In the event that the legislature disagrees with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution, a constitutional amendment may be
effected by a supermajority vote of approval in each house of Parliament.37
These features are not unique to India; many other Asian common law
jurisdictions have similar provisions that were written into their Constitutions
when they gained independence from British colonial rule after World War
11. 3
8
What is extraordinary about the Indian Constitution is that in 1973, a
majority of the judges on the Supreme Court declared that there was an implied
"basic features doctrine" governing the entire constitutional framework.39
Thereafter, the judges had the power and duty to invalidate a constitutional
amendment if it violates this unwritten fundamental features code.
In 1971, the Congress Party headed by Indira Gandhi swept into power in
a landslide victory, and in its zest to pursue agrarian reforms, passed the
Twenty-fifth Constitutional Amendment, which denied the courts jurisdiction
over any disputes relating to governmental acquisition and requisition of
property, and provided that any legislation passed to give effect to this policy
could not be questioned in a court of law.4" Subsequently, in Kesavananda, a
Kerala religious leader challenged the application of this land reform
legislation to the estate belonging to his religious community.41 The Twenty-
fifth Amendment had immunized Kerala agrarian reforms fromjudicial review,
35 INDIA CONST. arts. 12-35.
36 INDIA CONST. art. 13, § 2 (providing that "[t]he State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void").
37 INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2.
38 See, e.g., SING. CONST. arts. 4, 5, § 2; MALAY. CONST. art. 159, § 3.
" Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1.
40 See Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 107 (B.N.
Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
41 Id.
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and the Supreme Court thus had to decide whether Parliament had the power
to amend the Constitution so as to derogate from a citizen's right to religious
liberty and property.42 While the Kesavananda court unanimously held that
Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution so as to limit the scope of
fundamental liberties enshrined within, the Court in a 7-6 split held that
Parliament may not pass a constitutional amendment to insulate from judicial
review all legislation designed to implement the Constitution's directive
principles.43 The majority argued that this would violate the basic structure of
the Constitution by eliminating the Court's role as the guardian of the
citizenry's fundamental liberties." To effect such a drastic change to the
Constitution, the majority held that a new Constituent Assembly had to be
convened to ratify the changes.4
While conceding the amenability of the fundamental rights, the Court
asserted the power to determine whether such a constitutional amendment
would abrogate the basic features of the Constitution as understood by the
judges.46 The exact boundaries of the basic structure doctrine have, however,
never been definitively delineated by the Supreme Court. In Kesavananda, the
majority of seven judges issued five separate opinions, making it difficult to
distill a single holding.47 Nonetheless, some political ideals suggested by
individualjustices as beyond Parliament's constitutional amendment authority
include the following: the supremacy of the Constitution,48 the secular nature
of the state,49 separation of powers,5" federalism,5 national sovereignty,52
dignity of the individual,53 parliamentary democracy, 4 and judicial review.55
After Kesavananda, the Supreme Court of India invoked the basic structure
doctrine four other times to invalidate amendments made to the Constitution.
In Indira Gandhi, the Supreme Court invalidated Article 329A(4) of the
42 Kesavananda Bharati, [ 1973] Supp. S.C.R. at 199-200.
43 Id. at 216, 292, 555.
" Id
45 Id. at 214, 288, 289.
46 Id. at 216, 292, 555.
47 Id.





2 Id. at 454 (Shelat, J. & Grover, J.).
53 Id.
54 Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1, 637 (Reddy, J.).
5 Id. at 767 (Khanna, J.).
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Constitution as inserted by the Thirty-ninth Amendment, which insulated the
election of a prime minister from judicial inquiry, on the ground that it was
inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers.5 6 Next, in
Minerva Mills, the Court voided Article 3 1C as inserted by the Forty-second
Amendment, which had subverted constitutional rights to the Constitution's
directive principles and insulated from judicial review legislative enactments
designed to implement the directives.57  Subsequently, the Court in
Sambamurthy voided Article 371D(5) as inserted by the Thirty-second
Amendment, which had given state governments the power to model or annul
orders issued by the administrative tribunals." Finally, in Chandra Kumar, the
Court invalidated Article 323A as inserted by the Forty-second Amendment,
which had removed the jurisdiction of the High Courts in instances when the
administrative tribunals had jurisdiction and directed that the decisions of the
tribunals be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts. 9
Essentially, pursuant to the Kesavananda doctrine, the Indian Supreme
Court has the power to invalidate constitutional amendments that violate
unwritten basic features ofthe Indian Constitution as discerned by thejudges.6"
According to the Court, such drastic amendments may only be introduced by
a Constituent Assembly, not through piecemeal individual constitutional
reforms by Parliament.6
B. Canada and the Legislative Override
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted and entrenched
within the Constitution Act in 1982 after a prolonged legislative debate to
enshrine the judicial protection of human rights within the folds of Canada's
supreme law.62 The judiciary is imbued with the power to invalidate statutes
it finds incompatible with the Charter, as Section 52 of the Constitution Act
provides that such enactments would be "of no force or effect."63 Express
56 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299.
7 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789.
s Sambamurthy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 663.
9 Chandra Kumar v. India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125.
6' Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1,216,292, 555.
61 Id. at 214, 288, 289.
62 Canadian Charter, supra note 7.
63 Constitution Act, 1982, § 52(1) (providing that "[t]he Constitution of Canada is the
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect").
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amendments to provisions of the Charter require extraordinary consensus
among lawmakers.' The Charter may only be amended with the agreement of
the Federal Parliament and 2/3 of the provincial legislatures, as long as the
legislatures represent at least 50% of the Canadian population. 5
Despite the cumbersome amendment process, the inclusion of Section 1 and
Section 33 in the Charter was intended to prevent the Supreme Court of
Canada from transitioning into the American paradigm where the judiciary is
the default final adjudicator of constitutional norms.66 Section 1 of the Charter
subjects the rights it guarantees to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."67 The
Supreme Court of Canada held in R. v. Oakes that pursuant to this provision,
the onus is on the government to prove that such a legislative impairment of
fundamental liberties serves a pressing and substantial objective that cannot be
achieved by other less invasive means.68 In the event that the impugned law
fails to meet the rigor of the Oakes test, the Canadian judiciary has the power
to invalidate the legislation as null and void.
In spite of the judicial nullification, Section 33 of the Canadian Charter
provides the Federal Parliament or provincial legislatures the power to override
the court's decision.69 The legislature may expressly declare that an enactment
shall operate "notwithstanding" a Charter violation and re-enact the original
law in the face of judicial objection. The effect of this "notwithstanding"
clause expires at the end of five years but may be re-enacted indefinitely every
five years for the suspension to remain in force.7" Nevertheless, Section 33
does not operate against all the rights and freedoms contained in the Canadian
Charter. Specifically, Charter provisions protecting language rights, mobility
rights, and the right to an election every five years are not subject to legislative
suspension.7
As an act of protest against the Charter that it did not assent to, the Quebec
provincial government passed a legislative amendment in 1982, shortly after
- Id. § 38(1).
65 Id.
6See KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIvISM OR DEMOCRATIC
DIALOGUE 104 (2001).
67 Canadian Charter § 1.
68 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103.
69 Canadian Charter § 33(1).
70 Id. § 33(3).
71 See id. § 16 (protecting language rights), §§ 3-5 (protecting voting rights), § 6 (protecting
mobility rights). None of these rights is subject to the Section 33(1) override.
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the enactment of the Charter, which added the Section 33 "notwithstanding"
clause to all the provincial enactments in force, thereby insulating the province
72from Charter review. This blanket override was, however, not renewed five
years later. Similarly, when the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated a
Quebec law that permitted only the use of the French language on outdoor
signs,73 the province once again responded with an override, but allowed the
suspension to lapse again five years later.
In 1986, the Saskatchewan provincial government passed a labor statute
ordering government employees on strike to return to work.74 To prevent a
successful Charter challenge on the ground that this enactment would be in
violation of the workers' freedom of association, the government used the
Section 33 override prospectively to preempt any adverse judicial ruling.75 In
the most recent use of the legislative override, the Alberta provincial
government in 1999 passed a statute limiting marriage to a union between a
man and a woman and employed the "notwithstanding" clause to insulate the
enactment from Charter review. This override was renewed in 2006.76
C. The United Kingdom and the Declaration of Incompatibility
The Human Rights Act was passed in 1998 to incorporate the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) domestically within the United
72 See Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.Q., ch. L-4.2 (1982). This Act
repealed all of Quebec's legislation and then re-enacted it with newly affixed "notwithstanding"
declarations.
7' Ford v. Quebec, [ 1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. In 1993, the Quebec National Assembly enacted
a new legislation permitting other languages to be used on outdoor signs so long as French was
the predominant language. See Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., Ch.
C-11, amended by 1993 S.Q., ch. 40, s. 18 (Can.).
" See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 726.
71 Saskatchewan Bill 144 of January 1986 contained a Section 33 override as the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had earlier struck down similar legislation on the basis that it
infringed freedom of association as guaranteed in the Charter, but that decision was later
reversed by the Supreme Court in RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
76 Marriage Amendment Act, S.A. 2000 ch. 3. For a fuller discussion, see Kent Roach,
Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the
United States, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 347, 367 (2006). The use of the override, and its renewal,
by the Alberta government was, in all probability, unconstitutional. The recognition and
registration of marriage is a federal concern, and only the Federal Parliament may legislate such
matters. This position was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Reference re Same-
Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
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Kingdom, and the legislation came into effect on October 2, 2000.7" Unlike
the United States Bill of Rights or the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, amending this Act requires only a simple majority vote in
Parliament.78 Furthermore, there is a unique statutory obligation under the
Human Rights Act for the minister sponsoring a new Bill to inform Parliament
whether the new legislation is compatible with Convention rights.79 The
executive evaluation for ECHR compatibility is also complemented with a
process of legislative review, which takes the form of the Joint Committee on
Human Rights, a parliamentary committee tasked with advising Parliament on
the compatibility of a legislative bill with established human rights norms.8"
The linchpin of the Human Rights Act that distinguishes the United
Kingdom's model of human rights enforcement from the other constitutional
systems lies in the intricate statutory interrelationship between Section 3 and
Section 4. According to Section 3, courts must interpret and give effect to
legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights "[s]o far as it is
possible to do so .. ."" In the event that a compatible reading may not be
achieved, pursuant to Section 4, British courts may issue a formal declaration
of incompatibility.82  Notwithstanding this declaration, the impugned
legislative provision is not nullified and continues to have full effect and
validity.8 3 Furthermore, despite the issuance of such a declaration, Parliament
is under no legal duty to amend the legislation; but if he/she so chooses, the
relevant minister is empowered under Section 10 to make a remedial order that
could be "fast tracked" through both houses of Parliament. 84 The traditional
" See Joanna Harrington, The British Approach to Interpretation and Deference in Rights
Adjudication, 23 SUP. CT. L. REv. 269, 269-70 (2004).
78 Id.
79 Human Rights Act § 19.
80 See Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help
Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1 (2006).
83 Human Rights Act § 3(1).
82 Id. § 4(2) reads, "[i]fthe court is satisfied that the [legislative] provision is incompatible
with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility."
83 Id. § 4(6).
' See id. § 10(2), sched. 2. Essentially Schedule 2 provides that ordinarily, a remedial order
drafted by the minister must be approved by resolution by each house of Parliament. If the
minister deems the matter an emergency, the minister need only present the order to Parliament
after it has been made. The remedial order will cease to have effect after 120 days if it is not
subsequently approved by parliamentary resolution. In any case, all acts pursued under the




concept of parliamentary sovereignty is preserved as the decision to amend
impugned legislation remains a prerogative of Parliament.
There were early indications that the courts would be aggressive in reading
statutes in a way that would make them compatible with the ECHR. In R. v.
A (No. 2), a majority in the House of Lords, against parliamentary intent, used
its Section 3 interpretive powers to subject a penal provision that restricted the
admissibility of evidence about a complainant's sexual history to an additional
"implied provision" that evidence necessary to ensure a fair trial was
nonetheless still admissible. 5 However, the House of Lords did not take long
to retreat from this zealous interpretive mode. 6 In Anderson, the House of
Lords refused to use Section 3 to read into a sentencing provision a new rule
that the Home Secretary may not impose a prison tariff that exceeds a judicial
recommendation on the ground that this would conflict directly with
Parliament's intentions.87 Instead, the Law Lords declared that the Home
Secretary's role in deciding the length of imprisonment terms was
incompatible with the ECHR.8
The initial hesitation over the judicial use of a declaration of
incompatibility could be attributed to the fact that paradoxically, Section 4 was
perceived to be a more activist interpretive tool. Section 4 requires courts to
sit in judgment over the propriety of Parliament's actions. In contrast, Section
3 was a more discreet legal tool that allows courts to "read in" words or "read
down" a statute to achieve a Convention compatible reading of a legislative
provision. It is thus not surprising that the Lord Chancellor, when ushering the
Human Rights Bill through Parliament, exhorted the courts to "strive to find
an interpretation of legislation which is consistent with [C]onvention rights so
far as the language of the legislation allows and only in the last resort to
conclude that the legislation is simply incompatible with them."89  His
Lordship was confident that "in 99 [percent] of the cases.., there will be no
need for judicial declarations of incompatibility."9 As it turns out, Section 3
85 R. v. A (No. 2), [2002] 1 A.C. 45.
86 This trend first took root in In re S. [2002] UKHL 10 (appeal taken from Eng.). In that
case, the English Court of Appeal decided to read into the Children Act a range of new powers
and procedures by which courts could superintend the implementation of care orders by local
authorities, a result the legislation was clearly drafted to avoid. This decision was unanimously
overturned by the House of Lords.
87 R. (Anderson) v. Sec'y of State [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 A.C. 837.
88 Id.
89 583 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 535.
90 585 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998) 840.
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has become the stronger provision, whereby judges can amend the statute for
themselves instead of waiting passively for the legislature to do so following
a Section 4 declaration.9 In observance of the constitutional mantra that
Parliament is supreme, the British judges are now readier to use Section 4 to
note their discomfort with any legislative violations of human rights than apply
a Section 3 re-interpretation.92
D. New Zealand and the Interpretive Mandate
The Bill of Rights (NZBOR) was passed in 1990 to herald a new age of
human rights protection in New Zealand.93 Section 6 of NZBOR contains an
interpretive mandate that inspired the current section 3 of the United Kingdom
Human Rights Act: "[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is
consistent with... [the] Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any
other meaning." 94 Similar to Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, Section 5 of
the NZBOR contains a general limitations clause which allows for the
enshrined rights to be limited by legislation that can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.95
In Moonen, the Court of Appeal, in obiter held that Section 5 of the
NZBOR "necessarily involves the Court having the power, and on occasions
the duty, to indicate that although a statutory provision must be enforced
according to its proper meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. ..,"
although to date it has never issued such a formal declaration. 96 Although the
NZBOR was silent on whether the judiciary can issue a judicial indication of
9' See discussion infra Part IV.C.
92 Danny Nicol, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson, PUB. L.,
Summer 2004, at 281. Lord Steyn in Ghaidan v. Ghodin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004]
2 A.C. 557, lamented that there have been only ten Section 3 interpretations by higher courts,
while the judiciary has issued as many as seventeen declarations of incompatibility, ten of which
were still standing.
13 N.Z. Bill of Rights Act, supra note 12. The preamble of the New Zealand Bill of Rights
provides that it is "[a]n Act: (a) [t]o affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental
freedoms in New Zealand; and (b) [t]o affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Id. pmbl.
Id. §6.
9' Section 5 of the NZBOR provides that: "the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Id. § 5.




inconsistency, the Court has taken the bold step of reading in such powers.97
As declared by the Moonen Court, "[s]uch judicial indication will be of value
should the matter come to be examined by the [United Nations] Human Rights
Committee. It may also be of assistance to Parliament if the subject arises in
that forum."98 Even though the Court of Appeal had read in the power to issue
a declaration of inconsistency in the absence of express statutory authorization,
it is still bound by Section 4 of NZBOR, which provides that courts do not
have the power to hold legislative provisions impliedly invalid or decline to
apply such a provision of the enactment.99 Thus, like the United Kingdom's
courts, New Zealand's judiciary is not vested with the power to nullify
legislation, nor is it allowed to assume that the passage of the Bill of Rights
renders older enactments invalid.
Like its British counterpart, the New Zealand judiciary has also been
"creative" in its use of the Section 6 interpretive mandate, to the chagrin of
some commentators.'00 In Baigent's Case, the New Zealand Court of Appeal
created a public law compensating aggrieved applicants under the NZBOR and
confining statutory immunities for the Crown to damages sought in private
law. ' While this decision marked a brave and laudable leap taken by the
judiciary to advance human rights enforcement in New Zealand, the critique
that the judicial creation of a remedy absent in the Bill of Rights ran against
statutory directions remains unanswerable.'0 2 But like the United Kingdom
judiciary, the New Zealand courts have not been consistently adventurous in
the use of their interpretive mandate. In R. v. Phillips, the judiciary was
confronted with a penal provision that stated that an accused found in
possession of restricted drugs should, "until the contrary was proved," be
" After Moonen, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Human Rights Amendment Act
2001, which expressly permits courts to issue a formal declaration of inconsistency when a
statute infringes against a person's right against discrimination enshrined under section 19 of the
NZBOR. See Human Rights Act 1993, amendedby Human Rights Amendment Act 2001, § 92J.
" Moonen, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 23-24.
99 Section 4 of the NZBOR provides that "[n]o court shall, in relation to any enactment
(whether passed or made before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), (a) [h]old any
provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or
ineffective." N.Z. Bill of Rights Act, supra note 12, § 4.
100 See James Allan, Turning Clark Kent into Superman: The New ZealandBill ofRights Act
1990, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 613 (2000); John A. Smillie, The Allure of "Rights Talk": Baigent's
Case in the Court ofAppeal, 8 OTAGO L. REV. 188, 191 (1994).
... Simpson v. Attorney-General [Baigent's Case], [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667, 1994 N.Z.L.R.
LEXIS 654 (C.A.).
,02 Smillie, supra note 100, at 191.
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deemed to be in possession of the drugs for illegal purposes. 0 3 In a very terse
judgment, the Court of Appeal refused to "read down" the legal burden
imposed on an accused to an evidential burden of production, on the ground
that such an interpretation would be "strained and unnatural."'' "
IV. EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS
A. India and the Basic Features Doctrine
The intentions of the majority on the Kesavananda court in reading implied
limitations on the constitutional amending powers of Parliament were
undoubtedly benevolent. These judges were convinced that the creation of the
Kesavananda doctrine was necessary to protect the fundamental core of the
Constitution from the tyranny of a transient supermajority in Parliament, and
their concerns were not unfounded.0 5
In 1975, the most egregious display of Parliament's abuse of its
constitutional amending powers surfaced. The Allahabad High Court had set
aside Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's election in her constituency for electoral
misconduct. Pending appeal, Parliament, composed of Gandhi's Congress
Party members, passed the Thirty-ninth Amendment, which inserted Article
329(A) into the Constitution, thereby canceling the judgment of the Allahabad
High Court and insulating all electoral disputes vis-A-vis the Prime Minister
from any form of judicial inquiry.0 6 In a subsequent challenge that this
constitutional amendment violated the Kesavananda doctrine, the Supreme
Court responded by invalidating the Thirty-ninth Amendment on the basis that
the basic structure of the Constitution precluded the legislature from placing
any individual above the law, but reversed the Prime Minister's criminal
conviction on the merits.10
7
However well-founded the fears of legislative excesses and benign the
intentions of the Kesavananda judges, the existence and development of the
basic features doctrine have their perils. The power to annul constitutional
amendments approved by a supermajority in Parliament marks the zenith of
judicial activism; ultimately it falls on the Court's own sense of self-restraint
103 R. v. Phillips, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 175, 175, 1991 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 719 (C.A.).
104 Id. at 182.
115 See Ranachandran, supra note 40.




that prevents the judiciary from running amok with this doctrine. Given that
the basic features are unwritten in the Constitution, it falls to the judges'
discretion to determine the scope of this doctrine. As illustrated in
Kesavananda, even the judges have difficulty reaching a consensus on its
parameters.08 While admittedly the judges have been restrained in the use of
the doctrine to invalidate constitutional amendments, there is no guarantee that
a future court would share such judicial modesty. Given that this doctrine is
judge-made, there is nothing that can stop a future Court from expanding the
breadth of the Constitution's basic structure to cover the entire Constitution
such that this living document, which is to govern the future affairs of men, is
held hostage to the nostalgic whims of a few judges. Furthermore, the
theoretical possibility that such fundamental changes may nonetheless be
effected at a new Constitutional Assembly is mythical at best. It is ludicrous
to suggest that India, or any nation-state, must ratify a whole new Constitution
whenever Parliament decides to make changes to the Constitution that the
judges deem fundamental.
This basic structure thus stands in the way of future constitutional reform.
With the instability brought about by constant short stints of minority
governments, there have been calls within the political circles for India to
switch over to a presidential form of government.0 9 Even if this suggestion is
effected into practice by a constitutional amendment, the Kesavananda
doctrine may still pose an insurmountable obstacle. Justice Reddy in
Kesavananda had accepted the premise that a parliamentary form of
government was a basic feature in India.' If a majority on the bench accepts
his view, any such constitutional amendment would be doomed at conception.
Similar concerns would surface if India decides to dismantle its federal system
in favor of a unitary state."' Furthermore, one can imagine that India may
accede to treaties in the future that require the submission of certain human
rights or economic disputes to the jurisdiction of supernational bodies. It is not
inconceivable that a reactionary panel of the Supreme Court may consider such
amendments a violation of the state's national sovereignty, a basic feature of
the Constitution.' 1
2
'0' Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1.
1.9 Ramachandran, supra note 40, at 128.
1o Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. at 637.
Id. at 366 (Sikir, C.J.).
112 Id. at 454 (Shelat, J. & Grover, J.).
2006]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Admittedly, with the abandonment of the basic features doctrine, concerns
that a transient supermajority in Parliament may once again abuse its
constitutional amending powers remain. However, Parliament must at least
regularly face the consequences of its decisions at the ballot box, and
unpopular constitutional amendments may be reversed by a new government
pursuant to a regime change. Following the legislative excesses of the
Congress Party in the mid-1970s, the people quickly rebuffed the Gandhi
government in the 1977 elections, and the new Janata government immediately
repealed various drastic constitutional amendments passed by its predecessor
that truncated fundamental liberties." 3 However, the judges on India's highest
court are not electorally accountable to the public; with the persistence of the
basic features doctrine, there is nothing the citizenry or its elected
representatives can do to reverse an egregious decision save convening a new
Constituent Assembly. Repealing a constitutional amendment is not easy, but
at least it is simpler than convening a new Constituent Assembly. The choice
ofrejecting the basic features doctrine is not about endorsing supermaj oritarian
tyranny, nor is it just about living with the "lesser evil" of temporary
legislative excesses. Given that both the judiciary and the legislature are
capable of making constitutional blunders, the proposal to abandon the
Kesavananda doctrine is ultimately about choosing one formula for initiating
constitutional change over another.
B. Canada and the Legislative Override
The beauty of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms lies in its
structural design, which permits the legislature to engage in a dialogue with the
judiciary about human rights protection in Canada.' Adjudication permits an
aggrieved applicant to take an "appeal from the rough-and-tumble of politics
to a 'forum of principle,' but [S]ection 33 confers a right of final appeal back
to a consequently more informed and conscientious legislature."' 5 Professor
Kent Roach explains that, during the course of constitutional adjudication,
"courts remind legislatures of values that otherwise might be neglected and
"3 Gobind Das, The Supreme Court: An Overview, in SUPREME BUTNOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, supra note 40, at 22-23.
"4 Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter ofRights Isn't Such a Bad Thing Afier All), 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 75 (1997).
115 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 451, 453 (2003).
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legislatures respond (via Section 1 and 33) by expanding or refining the terms
of the debate by making clear why rights have to be limited in particular
contexts."' 16  Judicial invalidation of a legislative enactment is thus an
occasion for the legislature to have a "sober second thought" about whether it
is absolutely necessary to pursue its stipulated goals by the current means."17
However, F.L. Morton has questioned whether the legislature can always
reinstate the old law after judicial nullification. According to him, certain
issues like abortion and gay rights cut across normal lines of partisan cleavage
and are so divisive that their invalidation would only create a new "judicially-
created policy status quo.""' Elaborating on this point, Morton argues that
these issues often involve a tussle between two minority camps and an
apathetic majority; in such instances the legislature's preferred choice is to do
nothing, as legislative activity on behalf of either camp would trigger the wrath
of the other."9 Thus, when the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated the
abortion laws 20 or when it held that Alberta's failure to prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination is a Charter violation,'2 ' the judiciary inevitably
imposed a new status quo on the government by tipping the legislative balance
in favor of one minority group interest over another. While I would agree with
Morton that the judiciary indeed changes the policy status quo when it
invalidates controversial legislations, I consider this power transfer a virtue
rather than a vice. The bureaucratic inertia that must be overcome before a
ruling government can be provoked to act on human rights issues is often
foreboding. In instances where the rights of politically marginalized minorities
conflict with the wishes of a sizable segment of society,'22 the vested interest
of the administration is to preserve the status quo until the pressure for
116 ROACH, supra note 66, at 250.
117 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLmcs 25-26 (2d ed. 1986).
118 F.L. Morton, Dialogue or Monologue? A Reply to Hogg and Thornton, POLICY OPTIONS,
Apr. 1999, at 23, 24, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/po0499.htm#morton.
"9 Id. at26.
120 In R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down
restrictions on abortion in the Criminal Code as unduly depriving pregnant women of their
liberty and security as protected under Section 7 of the Charter. In 1990, a bill introducing a less
restrictive abortion law was introduced in Parliament, but it was defeated by a tie vote in the
Senate. Since then, the divisive issue of abortion has not been revisited by the legislature.
121 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
122 Mac Darrow & Philip Alston, Bills ofRights in Comparative Perspective, in PROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 465, 487 (Philip
Alston ed. 1999).
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initiating reforms is greater than the convenience of leaving things unchanged.
By allowing judges to invalidate legislative enactments on the basis that the
statutes violate human rights norms, the benefit of legislative inertia is
bestowed upon the aggrieved political minority, as it is given a tangible
remedy while Parliament is forced to deliberate and decide whether to use the
Section 33 override. If Parliament is unable to garner a simple majority vote
to overturn a judicial decision, it only goes to show that the court's decision
is not egregious enough for such a legislative consensus to be reached. So far
as the judiciary has imposed a new policy status quo on the legislature, it is
just an inevitable trade-off for this system of human rights enforcement. As
long as the ordinary legislative process can correctjudicial errors, any concern
about an overzealous judiciary is largely misplaced.
In the same vein, Professor Tushnet expresses concern that political "veto
points" in the Canadian parliamentary system can allow a minority in
Parliament to estop a majority in the legislature from using the Section 33
override; in this sense, weak-form review can escalate into strong-form review
easily.13 Nonetheless, the concern over veto points is not one exclusive to
judicial review. Veto points are present when Parliament seeks to pass any
legislation, not just the legislative override. Building coalitions and consensus
among lawmakers to obtain an ordinary majority in Parliament is part and
parcel of the legislative process. As long as the legislative override does not
pose a greater obstacle to Parliament than the ordinary legislative processes,
any concern that popular whims have been thwarted has to be accepted as a
necessary quid pro quo for a constitutional system where Parliament can be
forced to address contentious social issues and take political responsibility for
its actions.'24
On the other hand, some might argue that the inclusion of a
"notwithstanding" clause when compared to the United States constitutional
framework is regressive so far as it allows a simple legislative majority to
interpret judicially interpreted constitutional norms, thus making the Bill of
Rights vulnerable to majoritarian excesses.'25 However, this argument might
take us too far as it would also rule out the use of constitutional amendments,
since they can equally be abused by a supermajority to the detriment of
123 Tushnet, supra note 3, at 834.
124 Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221,
250-51 (2002).




individuals. Given that both the judicial and legislative branches are
susceptible to making constitutional blunders, "[o]ne cannot choose ...
between formal amendment and legislative override as the preferred method
for revising judge-made constitutional policy simply by a priori reasoning
about rights and democracy."'' 26 One can only make a practicaljudgment about
the relative competence of these imperfect institutions in safeguarding rights
while preserving democracy. The brilliance of the Section 33 override lies in
the fact that the suspension is temporal. Its automatic lapse after five years
allows a newly elected government to decide afresh whether to renew the
legislative override. The duration of the override is also in accordance with
the temporary electoral mandate of the current government to invoke this
power in furtherance of the public good, and it allows the judicial decree to be
reinstated by default if a subsequent legislature lacks the popular mandate to
extend the override. This system of constitutional review thus marks the best
of both worlds: it provides the means by which an independent branch of
government can address a difficult and possibly divisive human rights issue,
yet permits popularly elected officials to respond to the judicial action in the
course of ordinary politics. 1
In response to the charge that judicial invalidation of legislative enactments
would fetter the range of options the legislature may have to rectify the
unconstitutionality of the status quo, 128 the Canadian judiciary has been
receptive to issuing delayed, general declarations of invalidity against
impugned enactments. 9 In Eldridge v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that British Columbia's failure to provide sign language
interpreters to the deaf, when necessary for effective communication in the
provision of essential medical services, constituted an unreasonable violation
of a person's right to equality. 3° Nevertheless, the Court issued a general
declaration of invalidity that would take effect after six months so that the
126 Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 83 (1984).
'27 Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?
38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635 (2003).
128 Tushnet, supra note 33.
129 The suspended declaration was first introduced in Canada by the Supreme Court in the
Manitoba Reference, Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, to overcome the
emergency created by the Manitoba legislature's failure over ninety years to fulfill its
constitutional duty of enacting bilingual statutes, thereby avoiding the legal chaos that would
accompany the creation ofa "legal vacuum." See Bruce Ryder, Suspending the Charter, 21 Sup.
CT. L. REv. 267 (2003).
130 Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
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government had time to coordinate the activities of various institutions in order
to explore its options and formulate an appropriate response.' 3 ' General
declarations give the political branches the flexibility to fashion a response that
would take into account their oft limited resources, while suspended or delayed
declarations would give them time to select the optimum means to comply with
Charter requirements. In this way, dialogue between the legislature and the
judiciary is enhanced, and while the former is compelled to confront a social
issue at a time not of its choosing, Parliament is nonetheless provided with the
flexibility to consider and execute the precise means by which compliance
shall take effect.
132
Section 33 is, however, not without its structural weakness. First, it permits
legislatures to use the override prospectively even before the courts have
issued an adverse ruling.'33 So far as Section 33 is used to make legislative
enactments "bulletproof," courts are excluded from the Charter dialogue at the
outset and do not have the opportunity to provide the legislative branches with
independent insight as to how a more Charter-compliant legislation may be
crafted. Second, provincial legislatures may abuse the override. It is not
inconceivable that the state of Mississippi would have rapidly overturned the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,34 had a "notwithstanding" clause
been available. Thus, if a legislative override is introduced into a country's
bill of rights, as an alternative safeguard, another clause should be inserted to
allow the federal government via a supermajority vote to overturn a provincial
exercise of the override. This would allay any concerns that an errant province
would get away with any flagrant violation of human rights within its own
borders.
C. The United Kingdom and the Declaration of Incompatibility
Unlike the contemporary American model of constitutional review, the
United Kingdom's model of human rights protection disperses the duty of
superintending rights more widely by establishing opportunities and
obligations for the executive and legislative branches to evaluate the
compatibility of impending legislation with constitutional norms.'35 This
131 Id.
13' Kent Roach, Remedial Consensus and Challenge: General Declarations and Delayed
Declarations of Invalidity, 35 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 211 (2002).
113 See Canadian Charter § 33.
134 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' See discussion supra Part III.C.
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alleviates the concern, associated with the American paradigm, that judicial
review debilitates decision-making by leading the political branches to enact
laws without regard to constitutional considerations. 3 6 Thus, this intra- and
inter-institutional reflection of rights allows for a critical examination of the
relative merits of a piece of legislation by injecting a broader spectrum of
perspectives into the constitutional calculus.'3 7
Professor Gardbaum has also made a measured defense of the Human
Rights Act as the optimal constitutional response to the countermajoritarian
feature of judicial review. 38  Unlike the Canadian Charter, the United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act does not permit the legislature to override a
Convention right before a judicial ruling has been issued; 3 9 in this sense, the
absence of a preemptive legislative strike would "ensure both that the political
costs of an override are not too low and that the legislative debate is informed
by the judicial view."'"4
°
Notwithstanding the merits of the Human Rights Act, the British model of
constitutional review is less than ideal. First, there is an unsatisfactory tension
between the interplay of Sections 3 and 4. "41 An aggressive use of Section 3
would render Section 4 otiose; a habitual use of judicial declaration that has
no actual legal bite would reduce the Bill of Rights to a mere "paper tiger."'
' 42
The current compromise seems to be that the British courts will not use
Section 3 to contradict the clear words or necessary implication of the
legislation, 43 nor will they engage in legal reform that would have spillover
effects in other fields that require legislative coordination and policy
coherence.' 44 While this interpretation is a reasonable reconciliation of
Sections 3 and 4, it is not the only possible reading. A regressive court could
return the United Kingdom to a model of pure legislative supremacy.
136 Tushnet, supra note 33.
131 See Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist
Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1963 (2004).
138 See Gardbaum, supra note 2.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 759.
141 See CONOR GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (2004); Conor A.
Gearty, Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy andHuman Rights, 118 L.Q. REv. 248 (2002);
Gavin Phillipson, (Mis)Reading Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, 119 L.Q. REv. 183 (2003).
42 Howard Leeson, Section 33, The Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?, in JUDICIAL
POWER AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 297 (Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell eds., 2001).
141 See R. (Anderson) v. Sec'y of State [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 A.C. 837, 894.
'4 See Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 A.C. 467, 480.
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Second, the declaration of incompatibility is unsatisfactory to a victorious
complainant; the law remains effective and enforceable against him, and he
may seek no compensatory redress.'45 Under the Human Rights Act,
Parliament retains the legal right to legislate in a manner that the courts deem
incompatible with human rights norms, as the issuance of a Section 4
declaration does not affect the continued validity, operation, or enforcement
of the impugned provision.'46 Although the Section 10 remedial provision
allows a minister to make swift changes to the Act in question, there is no legal
duty for him to do so. The judicial issuance of a Section 4 declaration does
provide some form of political impetus for the executive to make legislative
amends; however, this pressure would only translate into legislative action if
popular opinion were aligned with that of the Court. Returning to my earlier
example of Brown in American jurisprudence,'47 if that case had been decided
in an environment where the Supreme Court's decree was merely advisory, de
jure racial segregation would have probably remained part of the U.S. legal
landscape for at least another decade after the judgment was issued. In the
end, the complainant who has been vindicated in court would have to bear the
burden of legislative inertia until the political branches review the status quo.
Third, a declaration of incompatibility may have more "bite" in the United
Kingdom than it would have in other common law jurisdictions such as the
United States. In the United Kingdom, a complainant who is confronted with
a ministerial refusal to remedy contested legislation may bring his grievances
before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.'48 To avoid the
political embarrassment from an adverse ruling issued by the ECHR, which the
United Kingdom is by treaty bound to heed, the British government may prefer
to resolve the matter domestically and make changes to the law before its hand
is forced by the supernational tribunal. On the other hand, in countries such
as the United States where the government is not treaty-bound to respect the
rulings of another supernational human rights tribunal, it is conceivable that
the legislature would flagrantly ignore any advisory recommendations issued
by the courts. Judicial chiding from the bench would become mere hollow
voices lost in the political wilderness.
145 See Human Rights Act § 4(6) (providing that "[a] declaration under this section ('a
declaration of incompatibility')--(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or
enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given; and (b) is not binding on the parties
to the proceedings in which it is made").
146 Id.
147 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148 See Harrington, supra note 77.
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D. New Zealand and the Interpretive Mandate
Like the British model of human rights protection, parliamentary
supremacy is preserved in New Zealand as the judiciary has neither the
authority to invalidate legislation nor to refuse to apply an enactment it deems
unconstitutional.'49 Even if the Court of Appeal decides to issue regular
declarations of inconsistency, these declarations in no way affect the
legislature's prerogative to decide whether to abide by the Court's
recommendation. 50 Professor Jock Brookfield was the first to suggest the idea
of a declaration of inconsistency in New Zealand.' 5 ' Given that Section 4 of
NZBOR only prohibits the courts from declining to apply a legislative
provision or holding that a legislative enactment has been impliedly repealed,
revoked, or rendered invalid or ineffective, it is open to the judiciary to read
in any powers not expressly excluded. Not only should this judicial input not
be perceived as gratuitous criticism, the courts should be lauded for enhancing
the deliberative decision-making process of the legislature by providing non-
binding independent insight to a separate branch of government.
Unfortunately, NZBOR shares structural flaws similar to the British Human
Rights Act. Given the limitations of New Zealand courts, Parliament
ultimately enjoys the benefit of legislative inertia; it can choose not to respond
tojudicial exhortations. The successful litigant is not provided with a tangible
remedy upon the conclusion of his suit, and his grievance is once again left to
the vagaries of the political process.
Moreover, recent court decisions raise the inherent dilemma that the New
Zealand judiciary faces over the application of Sections 4 and 6.152 While
Section 6 seems to be a qualified parliamentary mandate to uphold human
rights norms more aggressively, Section 4 serves as a leash to restrain any
judicial zeal. As argued by Andrew Butler, "[S]ection 6 operates on the
principle of the malleability of language and encourages the courts to exploit
that feature," while Section 4 works on the understanding that statutes have
static meanings which may not be circumvented by the Bill of Rights.'53 It is
1 See N.Z. Bill of Rights Act, supra note 12.
IS0 Andrew S. Butler, Judicial Indications of Inconsistency: A New Weapon in the Bill of
Rights Armoury?, 2000 N.Z. L. REV. 43.
' Jack Brookfield, Constitutional Law, 1992 N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 236.
152 Andrew S. Butler, The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 is a Bad Model for Britain, 17 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1997).
.53 Andrew S. Butler, Strengthening the Bill ofRights, 31 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
129, 133 (2000); Butler, supra note 152.
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thus inevitable that the coexistence of these conflicting statutory principles
would lead to the haphazard application of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore,
since Section 4 of the NZBOR saves any legislative enactment from
invalidation or implied repeal, the general limitations clause enshrined in
Section 5 would easily fall into disuse. Crown counsels who prefer not to
prolong litigation would quickly concede that a legislative provision is
incompatible with the Bill of Rights since it would be upheld in any case.
Judges, in turn, would not be explicit about whether they were upholding the
impugned enactment because of the Section 4 decree or because it survived a
Section 5 scrutiny and is deemed a reasonable limit on a protected human
right. Even where a Section 5 analysis is employed, some judges have only
given it cursory attention. For example, Reille v. Police concerned a dispute
where Parliament removed an accused's right to a jury trial for summary
convictions, prima facie in violation of Section 24(e) of the Bill of Rights,
which granted the right to jury trials for offenses with the possibility of
imprisonment terms extending beyond three months. 154 By way ofjustification
for this legislative encroachment of the protected right, Chief Justice
Eichelbaum only tersely mentioned that "no doubt behind the legislative policy
was the view that the Court system could not accommodate the luxury ofjury
trials for the very common type of prosecution for assault suitably brought
under the Summary Offences Act."' 55 While I agree with the Court's decision,
I take issue with the scant attention paid by the Chief Justice to a Section 5
analysis. Injustifying this limit as reasonable, the Court could have canvassed
arguments that the empaneling of juries for minor offences may incur undue
delay both for the Crown and the accused, a concern not to be quickly
dismissed since the right to trial without undue delay is equally guaranteed
under the NZBOR. '56
Similarly, in In re Bennett, a prisoner's right to vote was unequivocally
jettisoned by the Electoral Act of 1956, and his NZBOR claim was summarily
dismissed under Section 4, without any judicial inquiry into whether such a
rights limitation was reasonable under Section 5.157 Professor Kent Roach has
argued that the "reasonable limits" clause is actually the true engine of
dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary as it is the means by which
the legislature demonstrates to the court that its limitations on rights advance
's Reille v. Police, [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 587, 1992 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 757 (H.C.).
'" Id. at 591.
156 N.Z. Bill of Rights Act, supra note 12, § 25(b).
' In re Bennett, [1993] 2 H.R.N.Z. 358.
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important objectives that cannot be achieved by less drastic means."'8 So far
as the New Zealand judiciary has downplayed the importance of a Section 5
analysis, the political branches have been unnecessarily spared the opportunity
to justify and demonstrate to the court and the public at large how important
and necessary these limits are in a free and democratic society.
V. DIALOGIC MINIMALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
Despite the attractive features found in the Canadian constitutional
arrangements, it is unlikely that the United States would, in the near future,
restructure its Bill of Rights to be like that of its neighbor. American legal
scholars, past and present, have thus foisted the onus to make changes on their
Supreme Court. 15 9 Judges are thus urged to make doctrinal changes to their
jurisprudence so as to cabin the sweeping scope of judicial review. These
doctrinal alternatives include Thayerism, 16 ° Ely's theory of democracy
reinforcement, 161 and originalism. 62 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
explore and evaluate all the various theories. Suffice to say that the problems
with these theories have been explored exhaustively by other writers.163
My purpose is to focus on Cass Sunstein's model of judicial minimalism.
Professor Sunstein has argued in favor of a doctrine of "decisional
minimalism," whereby judges would say "no more than [what is] necessary to
justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided. . ..",
According to Sunstein, judges should issue decisions that are both "narrow"
and "shallow": narrow in the sense that courts should resolve the case at hand
and not formulate broad rules that govern related cases, 165 and "shallow" in the
sense that courts should attempt to reach "incompletely theorized agreements"
and avoid enunciations of basic principles. 66 For Sunstein, wide and deep
decisions should only be issued to cement a preexisting social consensus; in
158 ROACH, supra note 66, at 156.
159 See infra notes 161-63.
60 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
161 JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
162 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1(1971).
163 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875 (2003); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982).
'" SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 3-4.
165 Id. at 10.
166 Id. at 11.
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the interim, judicial deliberation is best conducted in the shadows of legal
uncertainty.'67 Therefore, Sunstein's brand of minimalism is credited for
making judicial errors less frequent and less damaging.' In a society as
diverse as the United States, decisional minimalism also serves as a strategy
of social inclusion, whereby courts minimize the alienating effects of
adjudication by only affirming the social vision of the winning party to the
extent it is necessary to decide the case, thereby preserving shades of legal
ambiguity for the losing party to take his grievances to another forum.'69
Despite its virtues, the use of narrow holdings nevertheless threatens
predictability, stability, and other rule of law values. Given that Sunstein has
deftly explained how the merits of gradualist decision-making outweigh its
vices when courts are not confident about the substantive content of wide
rules, I shall not further belabor the point as I am in full agreement on this
issue."' Notwithstanding this, I do not share Sunstein's enthusiasm for
"shallow" rules. Sunstein's primary reservation with "deep" legal reasoning
lies in the possibility of judicial errors. As he argues, "[j]udges are not...
trained as philosophers, and judges who make theoretically ambitious
arguments may well make mistakes that are quite costly, especially in
constitutional cases, where their arguments are (at least theoretically!) final." 171
Sunstein's discomfort with deep legal reasoning lies in his assumption that the
judges' theoretical muses are final and binding. While "wide" rules may
foreclose democratic deliberation and reduce congressional latitude in
responding to unpopular decisions, "deep" rules do not necessarily suffer from
the same vice. There is nothing antidemocratic about judges tracing their
decisions to deeper legal values so long as these principles are not fleshed out
as broad rules that foreclose democratic participation by the elected branches.
The primary concern in the United States over judicial review is the legislative
difficulty in overturning constitutional decisions. 72 So far as judges do not
bind the hands of the elected representatives, courts should be permitted to use
theoretical principles to urge the legislature by way of dicta toward a certain
course of action that avoids constitutional infamy. Moreover, the use of dicta
premised on legal principles avoids the vices of incompletely theorized
167 Id. at 57.
168 Id. at 49-50.
169 JamesA. Gardner, TheAmbiguity ofLegal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense ofJudicial
Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REv. 805 (1993).
170 SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 243.
171 Id. at 256.
172 See discussion supra Part II.
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agreements which, as conceded by Sunstein, may often lead to unfairness and
inconsistency as they are by their very nature unprincipled.'73
Pursuant to my model of judicial restraint, which I have termed "dialogic
minimalism," the Supreme Court of the United States can sidestep accusations
of democratic debilitation by pronouncing "narrow" rules while at the same
time providing some certainty to the law by using "deeply" reasoned, non-
decisive dicta to initiate a dialogue with the political branches about the
theoretical principles underpinning the Constitution. In announcing "narrow"
and "deep" holdings, jurists can avoid excessive interference with legislative
power while having the opportunity to fully explain the rationale and
assumptions behind their decisions. As these judicial recommendations are by
way of dicta, they are not binding on the legislature or the executive; but the
political branches are nonetheless provided with some judicial input, which
they can use to consider and respond in their own time to the constitutionality
of other related legislative or executive action not presented before the Court.
In Part IV of this Article, I argued that the Canadian model of judicial
review is the optimal constitutional model available in balancing legislative
finality with judicial protection of human rights, as it permits the legislature
and the courts to enter into a two-way human rights discourse. In the United
States, given that a constitutional decision cannot be reversed by ordinary
political processes, a dialogue between the two branches of government, as
opposed to either ajudicial or legislative monologue, can only take place if the
courts make aggressive use of nondecisive dicta to trigger a conversation about
the fundamental public values that should shape the social polity. While the
courts should not be the situs of the nation's constitutional dialogue, their
independent stature permits them to be the trigger in stimulating and nudging
the elected branches into a political deliberation on human rights.
This mode of constitutional reasoning is also not foreign to the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. In fact, as illustrated in recent case law, it is often
employed when the Court is confronted with the most divisive issues facing
American society: gay rights, presidential war powers, and the separation of
church and state.
In Lawrence v. Texas, a majority of the Court invalidated a Texas statute
prohibiting same-sex sodomy on the ground that it violated a person's
constitutional right to privacy, as enshrined in the Due Process Clause.174
What is interesting about this case is that the majority avoided addressing the
173 SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 245.
17' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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case on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause, an alternative argument put
forward by the petitioners. 7 While the ostensible reason for avoiding the
Equal Protection argument is that the Court wanted to dodge any question of
whether such a criminal prohibition would be upheld if opposite-sex sodomy
were equally prohibited,'76 a more credible reason for this reservation is that
the Court wanted to avoid answering definitively whether the disallowance of
same-sex marriage would be unconstitutional. After all, if the moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is not a legitimate state interest under
the Equal Protection Clause, taken to its logical conclusion, the denial of
marriage to same-sex couples would also fall afoul of its constitutional
mandate. The Court's narrow pronouncement under the Due Process limb thus
allows the democratic debate on gay marriage to continue. But to assume that
the Court was silent on same-sex marriage would be an understatement. By
way of nondecisive dicta, Justice Kennedy went on to expound a vision of the
principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment: "Equality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision
on the latter point advances both interests."'7 While the Court was careful to
bracket its decision by holding that this case "does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter,"' 78 the Court had, albeit opaquely, noted its inclination
by declaring that constitutional protections were afforded to "personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, [and] family
relationships . . ,,,7 and subsequently held that "[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do."'8 ° Thus, without forcing the hand of state legislators, the
Supreme Court has gently hinted where its proclivities lie.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a Supreme Court plurality held that the federal
government had the statutory authority to detain an American citizen captured
on foreign soil during active military operations as an enemy combatant, but
a majority agreed that the constitutional guarantee of due process granted him
the right to contest the factual basis of his detention before a neutral decision-
... Id. at 575.
176 Id.
177 Id.
' Id. at 578.




maker. 81 The Court left many key constitutional issues undecided, preferring
instead to rest its decision on the narrowest ground possible. First, the
plurality did not decide whether the president has plenary authority to detain
American citizens as enemy combatants pursuant to Article H of the
Constitution, choosing instead to find statutory authority for the detention."8 2
Second, while the majority explicitly declared that Hamdi must be given a
meaningful factual hearing, it did not specify the exact trial procedures that
must be followed, save the preservation of certain fundamental liberties such
as the right to notice of the charges, the right to respond, and the right to an
attorney."8 3 Notwithstanding this limited holding, the majority was emphatic
about the constitutional principles that have to be observed by the government
in times of war:
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation's citizens. Whatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it
most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake."'
In essence, the Court was refuting the government's incredible claim that in
times of war, the Court must forgo any individual examination of a detainee's
petition and is restricted to scrutinizing the legality of the broader detention
scheme.8 5 In articulating this principle, the Justices were in essence signaling
to the government that the judicial branch was aware that cases of a similar
nature would come before the Court in the coming years, and it would not
abdicate its constitutional duty during this trying moment in American history.
The Court would intervene where necessary to safeguard at home the same
values of freedom and democracy that the country was fighting for abroad.
Absent the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress, the Court
emphasized that the judiciary would play the "necessary role in maintaining
'l Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
112 Id. at 517.
113 Id. at 533-34.
'8 Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
'85 Id. at 528.
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this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on
the Executive's discretion in the realm of detentions. '" 186
Finally, in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, the
Supreme Court in another 5-4 decision held that the Establishment Clause
prohibited the posting of the Ten Commandments at courthouses.'8 7 Justice
Souter, for the majority, held that if the government acts with the predominant
purpose of advancing religion, the First Amendment would be violated.'88
Notwithstanding this holding, the majority limited the potential breadth of this
legal test by conceding, albeit in a footnote, that "Establishment Clause
doctrine lacks the comfort of categorical absolutes. In the special instances we
have found good reason to hold governmental action legitimate even where its
manifest purpose was presumably religious."' 89 Arguably, this concession
allowed the Court to avoid the hostility it would face if it has to exorcise the
invocations of God in public speeches by public officials, "the public
references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings, [and] the attention paid to
the religious objectives of certain holidays, such as Thanksgiving.' 190 Also,
by not expressly clarifying what these "special instances" or "good reasons"
were, the Court did not have to provide a preemptive constitutional shelter for
these forms of religion-motivated state action, thus allowing the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence to develop on a case-by-case, fact-driven basis. Despite
laying down a legal rule that was circumscribed by a vague exception, the
Court went on to explore the principle underpinning the Establishment Clause
so as to provide guidance to litigants in future cases: "the principle of
neutrality has provided a good sense of direction: the government may not
favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion.... "'91 The essence
of the Court's doctrine on separation of church and state was thus to guard
against the civic divisiveness that follows when the government weighs in on
one side of the religious debate.' 92 The Court seems to suggest that where
186 Id. at 536.
i87 McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
188 Id. at 2732-33. In the companion decision of Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 125 S.
Ct. 2854 (2005), the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision upheld the display of monuments
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. Justice Breyer
dissented from the McCreary majority as he believed that the monuments in question did not
have a predominately religious message, but were intended to convey a moral message that
reflected Texas's historical heritage.
189 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2735 n.10.
190 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring).




civic divisiveness would not arise as a result of a de minimis religion-
motivated state action, the Court would not preempt the democratic process
and prohibit its expression in public space.
Pursuant to my model of dialogic minimalism, American courts can use
"narrow" and "deep" holdings to engage the legislatures over the
constitutionality of divisive issues facing American society. "Narrow"
holdings do not interfere excessively with legislative power, while "deep"
reasoning affords an independent branch of government the opportunity to
frilly explain the rationale behind its decisions and to recommend, by way of
dicta, a constitutionally responsible course of action that the legislature and
executive can observe in related issues not presented before the Court.
VI. INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
NEW ZEALAND COURTS
The constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom and New Zealand
have been evolving, and it is not unforeseeable that the highest courts in both
states could some day have the power to invalidate statutory instruments,
subject to a parliamentary override. Until that fateful day dawns, the onus is
on these Commonwealth courts to make doctrinal adjustments to their
jurisprudence and ameliorate the structural deficiencies in their statutory bills
of rights. Essentially, these adjustments would involve the judges taking their
interpretive mandate under the respective human rights instruments more
seriously and avoiding the austerity of tabulated legalism.'93
In this part of the Article, I evaluate the key human rights decisions handed
down by the British House of Lords and the New Zealand Court of Appeal.
I also argue that the judiciary should be more "creative" in the use of its
interpretive mandates and as such, issue declarations of inconsistency only
when (1) a statutory reinterpretation would be textually impossible; (2) the
"reading in" of words would be tantamount to the enactment of a specific and
detailed quasi-legislative code; and (3) a linguistic construction would affect
the coherence of other related statutory regimes not at issue. These elements
are elaborated on in turn.
In R. v. A. (No. 2), the House of Lords held that a statutory scheme, which
limited the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's sexual history in a
rape trial to instances when a trial judge in his discretion believed that the
... Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from
Berm.).
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similarity between the sexual history of the complainant and the sexual
behavior at issue could not be coincidental, were in violation of an accused's
right to a fair trial. 94 The majority, contrary to Parliament's intentions of
limiting admissibility of evidence to three narrowly prescribed legislative
gateways, held instead that the Court's interpretive obligation under Section
3 required it to read the statute subject to an "implied provision" that evidence
necessary to ensure a fair trial was nonetheless still admissible.' 9 To the
chagrin of some commentators, 96 Lord Steyn boldly suggested that "it will
sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may
appear strained,"'97 and a declaration of incompatibility should not be issued
unless a "clear limitation on Convention Rights is stated in terms."' 98
The Steynian interpretive mode is also visible in some of the New Zealand
jurisprudence.' 9  In R. v. Poumako, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, albeit
in obiter, favored the use of the Section 6 interpretive mandate to "read down"
the retrospective effect of a criminal statute.2"' In that case, a majority on the
Court of Appeal had proposed that the retrospectivity of a "home invasion"
statute be confined to the two-week time gap between the coming into force of
the statute and another companion penal legislation.2' More significantly, the
majority held that "[i t is not a matter of what the legislature (or an individual
member) might have intended. The direction is that wherever a meaning
consistent with the Bill of Rights can be given, it is to be preferred."2"2
Richard Ekins decries this mode of interpretation as it "authorise[s] the de
facto entrenchment of judicial moral views in the face of clear legislative
judgment.""2 3 He would instead prefer courts to resolve ambiguity in favor of
a rights-consistent interpretation when such a competing and (equally
convincing) interpretation is available. First, it is a gross exaggeration to
suggest that the Steynian interpretation of Section 3 would necessarily lead to
a de facto entrenchment ofjudicial moral views; it was open to the Parliament
... R. v. A. (No. 2), [2002] 1 A.C. 45.
'9' Id. at 68.
196 See Richard Ekins, A Critique of Radical Approaches to Rights Consistent Statutory
Interpretation, 2003 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 641 (2003); Francesca Kug, Judicial Deference
under the Human Rights Act 1998, 2003 EuR. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 125.
"9' R. v. A. (No. 2), [2002] 1 A.C. at 68.
'98 Id. at 69.
'99 See, e.g., Simpson v. Attorney-General (Baigent's Case), [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667 (C.A.).
200 R. v. Poumako, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 695 (C.A.).
201 Id. at 703.
202 Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
203 Ekins, supra note 196, at 648.
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to harness a mere simple majority to reinstate its original views in clearer
terms via a statutory amendment but it chose not to. Any displeasure Ekins
feels toward the end result should be targeted at Parliament and not the courts.
Second, Ekins' interpretive theory, while tenable, is no different from judicial
modus operandi prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act; it would be
a strange state of affairs if Parliament's grant of a new interpretive license to
the courts to adopt a "possible" interpretation under Section 3 rather than a
"reasonable" interpretation, were read as a mere preservation of the status quo.
Unfortunately, neither the British nor New Zealand courts have been
consistent in applying the Steynian interpretive model. The House of Lords
in R. (Anderson) v. Secretary of State refused to use its Section 3 powers to
read into Section 29 of the Criminal (Sentences) Act of 1997 a new rule that
the Home Secretary may not impose a prison tariff that exceeded a judicial
recommendation.2" Particularly striking is Lord Steyn's ostensible turnabout
in R. (Anderson) v. Secretary of State, where he held that "Section 3(1) is not
available where the suggested interpretation is contrary to express statutory
words or is implication necessarily contradicted by the statute. 20 5 This
statement of law is an unfortunate concession, as on the facts, such an
interpretation is expressly contradicted by the statutory text: Section 29 of the
impugned Act expressly states that the Parole Board shall not make a
recommendation for release of a life prisoner "unless the Secretary of State has
referred the particular case ...to the Board . . .," and even on such a
recommendation, the Secretary of State "may," and not "shall," release the
prisoner.2"6 Since the legislation leaves it to the home secretary to decide
whether or when to refer a case to the parole board, and he is free to ignore its
recommendation, the decision on how long the convicted murderer should
remain in prison remains at the discretion of the home secretary. Thus, to read
Section 29 to preclude the participation of the home secretary would be
contrary to the text of the statute, and the Law Lords need not have conceded
the interpretive ground they gained in R. v. A. (No. 2). Similarly, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in R. v. Phillips, refused to "read down" a legal
burden imposed on an accused found with restricted drugs to prove he did not
have them for the purpose of sale, to an evidential burden of production on the
2o4 R. (Anderson) v. Sec'y of State [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 A.C. 837. The government
has since passed the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allows the courts and not the Home
Secretary to determine the minimum term to be served in prison by a person convicted of murder.
205 Id. at 894.
206 Id. at 843.
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basis that this interpretation would be "strained and unnatural."207 An opposite
conclusion was rightly reached by the House of Lords in Lambert, a case with
a similar reverse onus provision.2 8
In In re S., the House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal's reliance
on Section 3 to read into the Children Act of 1989 a new procedure by which
courts could supervise and monitor care orders by local authorities so as to
protect children and their families against the violation of their rights.2 9 More
significantly, Lord Nicholls, who wrote the lead judgment concluded that "a
meaning which departs substantially from a fundamental feature of an Act of
Parliament is likely to have crossed the boundary between interpretation and
amendment."2 ' This concession, taken at face value, would also seem to
overturn Lord Steyn's dicta in R. v. A. (No. 2). After all, a fundamental feature
of the impugned legislative provision in R. v. A. (No. 2) was to confine trial
judges' discretion in admitting prior sexual history evidence; so far as the
statutory scheme is now subject to a more generic implied provision, a cardinal
principle of the original scheme has been breached. While I would agree with
the House of Lords that Section 3 should not have been employed by the Court
in this instance, I would concur with the decision on a separate ground. On the
facts, the Court of Appeal read in a laundry list of procedural guidelines by
which courts could supervise the local authorities: the trial judge could identify
the crucial elements of a care plan at an early stage and elevate them to
"starred status," and if the "starred" milestones were not achieved within a
reasonable time, the local authority had the duty to inform the child's guardian
ad litem who could then return the case to court.2t ' Although such a
construction does not conflict with the express words in the statute, Section 3
should not have been employed by the courts here because it entails the courts
enacting lengthy and detailed changes to the law that were more suited for
Parliament to make. The essence of judicial law-making under the common
law has been the crafting of legal principles that guide the course of future case
law development; 212 it is not the drafting of a technical quasi-legislative code
207 R. v. Phillips, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 175, 177, 1991 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 719 (C.A.).
20 R. v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37, [2002] 2 A.C. 545. The House of Lords held that it was
possible to use Section 3 of the Human Rights Act to read down a legal burden imposed on an
accused to a mere evidential burden of production. Id.
209 In re S. [2004] UKHL 47, [2002] 2 A.C. 291.
20 Id. at 313.
211 Id. at 309.
212 Aileen Kavanagh, The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation Under the
Human Rights Act 1998, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 272.
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that spells out a series of extensive procedures by which parties can exercise
their new rights and duties, which was exactly what the Court of Appeal in In
re S. purported to do.2t 3 Only the government has the expertise to craft
extensive technical details into a statutory framework. Section 3 should not
have been employed in In re S. because the type of legal reform it entailed was
beyond the traditional competence of the courts and should remain a
prerogative of Parliament.
In Bellinger v. Bellinger, the House of Lords declined to interpret "female"
under a matrimonial statute to include a transsexual female and preferred to
issue a Section 4 declaration that the legislative restriction of marriage to
opposite-sex couples, as determined at birth, was incompatible with the
ECHR.214 In my view, this case was rightly decided not because the re-
definition of marriage was a contentious political thicket that the courts may
not venture into, nor that it would be against Parliamentary intent, but because
the recognition of gender assignment for the purpose of marriage would affect
many other aspects of human activity such as education, child care, gender-
specific criminal offenses, and prison regulations; and it would be more
prudent for these issues to be "considered as a whole and not dealt with in a
piecemeal fashion. ' 21
5
In a similar case, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held by a majority of
3-2 that legislative prohibition of gay marriage was not discriminatory, but it
unanimously agreed that the Marriage Act confined marital unions to opposite
sex couples, and a drastic re-interpretation to include same-sex couples was
foreclosed by Section 4 of the NZBOR.216 Although marriage was not
expressly confined to male-female partnerships, the Court was right to have
avoided using the interpretive mandate to confer the right to marry on
homosexual couples. However, unlike thejudges of the majority, I believe that
this institutional lacuna is discriminatory," 7 and that the Court should have
issued a proclamation of inconsistency instead, as Judge Thomas seemingly
213 In re S., [2002] 2 A.C. at 309.
24 Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 A.C. 467. After the decision, in 2004,
Parliament passed legislation conferring legal rights, prospectively, on all transsexual persons
who can demonstrate that they have gender dysphoria and live permanently in their acquired
gender. See Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c.7 (U.K.).
215 Bellinger, [2003] 2 A.C. at 480.
216 Quilter v. Attorney-General, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 1997 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 644 (C.A.).
217 Andrew Butler, Same Sex Marriage and Freedom from Discrimination in New Zealand,
1998 PuB. L. 396 (1998).
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did.2"' However, while Judge Thomas rested his decision on the basis that a
linguistic interpretation to permit gay marriage would be against parliamentary
intent,2 9 I would argue against such a statutory construction of the Marriage
Act because the recognition of same-sex marriage affects other areas of law
concerning child care, family, housing, inheritance, and tax; and it would be
more appropriate for Parliament to consider these issues as a whole rather than
have the judiciary make piecemeal reforms in an interlocking regime that
requires coherence. Given that courts are limited to resolving legal disputes
that are brought before them, where piecemeal judicial rectification would
affect statutory coherence in many related fields, Parliament is the only branch
of government that is competent to usher in such comprehensive reforms. A
declaration of incompatibility was thus the appropriate mechanism to signal
to the ruling government that change was due.
In Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, a majority of the House of Lords upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeal to use its Section 3 interpretive power and
accord same sex couples in a stable relationship the same status "as if they
were" husband and wife when succeeding to a tenancy left behind by the
deceased partner.22 ° The statute did not contain any express words excluding
protection for same sex partners.22' Furthermore, unlike Bellinger, incremental
gap filling in this instance also did not affect the coherence of other statutory
regimes not at issue, nor did it amount to the drafting of a lengthy, extensive,
quasi-legislative code as contemplated in In re S.222
VII. CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion, I have argued for the American courts to issue
"narrow" rules with "deep" reasoning during constitutional adjudication and
for the British and New Zealand courts to be more aggressive in their use of
the interpretive mandate. This naturally opens me to the charge that I am
essentially seeking to replicate in these "deficient" constitutional systems the
Canadian model of constitutional review so far as it is jurisprudentially
218 Quilter, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 554-55.
219 Id. at 541-42.
220 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 113. Paragraph 2(2) of
Schedule 1 of the Rent Act 1977 confers the right to succeed to a statutory tenancy on a person
who was "living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband." Rent Act, 1977, c.42
sched. 1, para. 2(2).
221 Rent Act, para. 2(2).
222 In re S. [2002] UKHL 10, [2002] 2 A.C. 291.
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possible. This point is well taken and I hereby conclude by explaining why I
defend this vision of constitutional democracy.
The dialogic structure of judicial review as espoused by the Canadian
system allows for both the courts and the legislature to be partners and fellow
interlocutors in upholding the rule of law. 223 Neither the judiciary nor the
legislature is a perfect institution. The former is composed of unelected
officials unaccountable to the public, and the latter is vulnerable to the whims
of a hostile majority. Judicial apologists may argue that the courts have a
"democratic mandate" either conferred by their Constitution or their human
rights instrument to interpret rights.224 However, this argument, while true, in
no way answers the critique that courts are less accountable to the public than
elected legislators for the decisions they make225 and are capable of making
egregious blunders of moral judgment.226 On the other hand, judicial skeptics
pay scant attention to the fact that because legislators are responsible to the
electorate, they generally focus on majoritarian needs and are open to
neglecting the politically vulnerable.227 Given that both institutions are equally
fallible, an ideal vision of constitutional democracy must accommodate the
role of both institutions in providing binding and independent contributions to
societal discourse on rights and freedoms. While neither institution can be
relied upon exclusively to further the demands of a rights-based democracy,
the risks of constitutional blunders are reduced when both institutions are
allowed to act in tandem to defend the rights for all.
As a United States Supreme Court constitutional decision can only be
overturned by a constitutional amendment enacted by supermajoritarian
legislative consensus, the Court's issuance of "narrow" rules reduces the
foreclosing effect of such a decision, thus providing Congress or the states
with the legislative space to respond to those contentious issues raised but not
decided by the judiciary, thereby allowing the democratic debate on these
223 Tom Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights
Act 1998, 2005 PUB. L. 306 (2005).
224 See A. v. Sec'y of State [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, para. 42 (Lord Bingham
holding that "I do not in particular accept the distinction which [the Attorney General] drew
between democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the judges in this country
are not elected and are not answerable to Parliament .... But the function of independent
judges charged to interpret and apply the law is universally recogni[z]ed as a cardinal feature of
the modem democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself.").
225 Richard Ekins, Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law, 119 L.Q. REv. 127, 144 (2003).
226 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856).
227 See Tushnet, supra note 3.
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issues to continue in the political arena. The provision of "deep" reasoning
adds independent judicial insight to this discourse but in no way settles the
discussion. On the other hand, for the Commonwealth courts that do not have
the power to invalidate statutory instruments, an aggressive use of their
interpretive mandate would allow an independent branch of government to
provide a binding remedy to aggrieved applicants sidelined by the ordinary
legislative process. Even if the judicial decision is later reversed by an
ordinary legislative enactment, the fuller debate on the legislative floor that
aggressive use of the interpretive mandate would entail ensures that the result
was reached after political deliberation and not legislative inadvertence. The
gamble, though not an unreasonable one, is that legislatures tend to take the
path of least resistance and will usually not disturb the status quo imposed by
the Court unless they deem it egregious, thus allowing the courts to enforce a
bill of rights with a tangible but not lethal bite.228
Judicial apologists might argue that this dialogic model ofjudicial review,
where Parliament can prevail by reinstating its original view with a simple
majority, may cure human rights violations that occur as a result of
parliamentary neglect or inadvertence but does not prevent an errant
Parliament from intentionally contravening fundamental rights, especially
against the interests of political minorities, with the majority's blessings.
This concern is what Lord Bingham was driving at when he defended the
House of Lords' landmark declaration that the indefinite detention without trial
of suspected foreign terrorists was unlawful.229 Perhaps a more extreme
example of Parliament's misuse of its popular mandate would be one where
the legislature, with the support of an electoral majority, uses its override to
suspend elections indefinitely, ostensibly in the name of national security.
This concern was recently considered by the House of Lords in R. (Jackson)
v. Attorney General.230 The main issue in that case was whether the passage
of the 1911 Parliament Act was valid. 231 Enacted against the objections of the
second legislative chamber, this statute permitted subsequent bills, other than
a Money Bill and a bill extending the maximum duration of Parliament beyond
228 Kent Roach, Dialogic JudicialReview and its Critics, 23 SuP. CT. L. REv. 49, 101 (2004).
229 A. v. Sec'y of State [2004] UXHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (holding that indefinite detention
of foreign terrorist suspects was both a disproportionate interference with a person's right to
liberty and a discriminatory measure in breach of his right to equal protection under Article 5
of the ECHR).
230 R. (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 A.C. 262.
231 Id. at 271.
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five years, to come into effect without the approval of the House of Lords.232
While the Law Lords in R. (Jackson) v. Attorney General unanimously agreed
that the 1911 Act was validly enacted, the individual members expressed
profound discomfort with the constitutional implications of the decision.233
Taken to its logical conclusion, the House of Commons with the support of the
electoral majority could use the bypassing procedure provided in the 1911 Act
to suspend all U.K. elections indefinitely by using a two-stage process, first by
removing the prohibition against term limit extensions in the 1911 Act, and
then by passing legislation extending the duration of Parliament indefinitely.
234
Faced with the possibility of such an egregious use of its popular mandate by
Parliament, it is understandable if one has sympathies for Lord Steyn's claim
of judicial supremacy in R. (Jackson) v. Attorney Gen.:
[T]he supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of
our constitution... In exceptional circumstances involving an
attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the
courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new
Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is [sic]
constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament
acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot
abolish.235
Lord Steyn's views are consonant with Professor Ronald Dworkin's claim that
judges should have "final interpretive authority" as they have been more
principled and reliable at making good decisions about democracy and any
version of democracy that requires "deference to temporary majorities on
matters of individual right ... is brutal and alien., 236 To allow the judiciary
to withdraw wholly, on its own accord, certain issues from democratic
232 Id. at 272.
233 Id. at 286-87, 302.
234 Lords Nicholls, Hope, Carswell and Baroness Hale opined that such an alteration would
not be allowed as it would be against the parliamentary intentions of the 1911 Act. As pointed
out by Michael C. Plaxton in The Concept of Legislation: Jackson and Others v. Her Majesty's
Attorney General, 69 MOD. L. REv. 249, 257 (2006), such an argument is legally dubious since
there is no reason to privilege the intentions of the Parliament in 1911 over subsequent
Parliaments' intentions.
235 R. (Jackson), [2006] 1 A.C. at 302-03.
236 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITuTioN 35, 71 (1996).
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decision-making and to permit these irreversible and electorally unaccountable
views to govern exclusively, we would ultimately only be exchanging the risk
of one form of abuse over another.237 Dworkin and Lord Steyn's optimism
assumes that the judiciary would always be staffed by a "bevy of Platonic
Guardians '2 38 who would labor tirelessly to defend the demands of democracy.
Given that the language of any bill of rights is malleable, counter-examples
where a reactionary judiciary can frustrate a democratic state's transition
toward proportional representation in Parliament is equally conceivable.
Where unwritten constitutional fundamentals are defined by the courts alone,
there is no guarantee that the result reached would always be morally
palatable. Furthermore, even if the judiciary is allowed to have the de jure
final voice in constitutional adjudication, where its views go against the
common opinion of both the legislature and the electorate, it is highly unlikely
that the court's judgment would be enforced in any case. The sad reality is
that while the courts can perhaps save the people from their legislature, with
neither purse nor sword, there is no way thejudiciary can save the people from
themselves. If Parliament, with the overwhelming support of the people,
decides to dismantle every vestige of democracy in a modern state, it would be
futile for the judiciary to stand as a bulwark and resist an electorate gone mad.
The resources and expertise of the judiciary would thus be better utilized
if they were harnessed to structure a constitutional dialogue with the
legislators. The replication of a dialogic model ofjudicial review in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand would require a paradigm shift
in critical thinking; that is, neither legislative nor judicial supremacy is the
only viable constitutional alternative. This halfway house allows thejudiciary,
while enforcing the bill of rights, to bind the legislature and executive to a
certain constitutional standard; at the same time, it does not displace the
legislature's prerogative to revise or reject the judicial views if they so choose,
without resorting to an onerous constitutional amendment. In the absence of
structural changes to each respective bill of rights, for the Americans this
would require judges to exercise more self-restraint and relinquish some of the
rule-making powers they have come to accept they possess.239 Conversely,
British and New Zealand judges have to be more receptive to "reading"
legislation in a way that they deem compatible with human rights and not
237 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (remarking "[w]e are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final").
238 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
239 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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always relying on the legislative chambers to make the necessary statutory
amendments, for the latter may not do so.
As Justice lacobucci rightly remarked in the Supreme Court of Canada's
Vriend decision:
[A] great value of judicial review and this dialogue among the
branches is that each of the branches is made... accountable to
the other. The work of the legislature is reviewed by the courts
and the work of the court in its decisions can be reacted to by the
legislature in the passing of new legislation .... This dialogue
between and accountability of each of the branches have the
effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying it.24
240 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 566.
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